## **Poole's Specificity Revised**

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## Specificity of Explanations in Logic Programm.

 [Poole, 1985]: David L. Poole.
 On the Comparison of Theories: Preferring the Most Specific Explanation.
 IJCAI9, pp. 144–147. Binary Specificity Relation

 [Simari & Loui, 1992]: Guillermo R. Simari, Ronald P. Loui.
 A Mathematical Treatment of Defeasible Reasoning and its Implementation.

Artificial Intelligence 53, pp. 125–157.

Specificity Relation is an Ordering

 [Stolzenburg &al., 2003]: Frieder Stolzenburg, Alejandro J. García, Carlos I. Chesñevar, Guillermo R. Simari. *Computing Generalized Specificity*.
 J. Applied Non-Classical Logics 13, pp. 87–113.

# Theory $\mathfrak{T}_{\Pi}$ / Derivability $\vdash$

A *literal* L is an atom A or a negated atom  $\neg A$ .

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The theory  $\mathfrak{T}_{\varPi}$  is inductively defined to contain

- **all** instances of literals from  $\Pi$ , and
- all literals *L* for which there is a conjunction *C* of literals from  $\mathfrak{T}_{\Pi}$  such that  $L \Leftarrow C$  is an instance of a rule in  $\Pi$ .

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For  $\mathfrak{L} \subseteq \mathfrak{T}_{\Pi}$ , we also write  $\Pi \vdash \mathfrak{L}$ .

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The set  $\Pi := \Pi^F \cup \Pi^G$  is the set of *strict* rules that

- contrary to the defeasible rules are
  - considered to be safe and
  - not doubted in the concrete situation.

## Specificity [Quasi-] Orderings on Arguments

 $(\mathcal{A}, L)$  is an *argument* if  $\mathcal{A}$  is a set of ground instances of  $\Delta$ , L is a literal, and  $\mathcal{A} \vdash L$ .

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
- Non-Transitive Specificity Relations:
  - $\lesssim_{P1}$  David Poole's original
  - $\lesssim_{\mathrm{P2}}$  Guillermo R. Simari's minor correction of  $\lesssim_{\mathrm{P1}}$
  - $\lesssim_{P3}$  Our minor correction of  $\lesssim_{P2}$

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
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  - $\lesssim_{\mathrm{P3}}$  Our minor correction of  $\lesssim_{\mathrm{P2}}$
- Transitive Specificity Relations (Quasi-Orderings!):
  - $\lesssim_{\rm CP1}$  Compared to  $\lesssim_{\rm P3}$ :
    - Reduction from  $\mathfrak{T}_{\Pi^{F}\cup\Pi^{G}\cup\Delta}$  to  $\mathfrak{T}_{\Pi^{F}\cup\Pi^{G}}$ .
    - Admission of  $\Pi^{\rm F}$  after *completed* defeasible argumentations.
  - $\lesssim_{\mathrm{CP2}}$  Efficiency improvement of  $\lesssim_{\mathrm{CP1}}$

## **Defeasible Parts of Derivation w.r.t.** $(\Pi^{\rm F}, \Pi^{\rm G}, \Delta)$




## Example 1 of [Poole, 1985]




$$\Pi^{\mathrm{F}} := \{ \mathsf{bird}(\mathsf{tweety}), \mathsf{emu}(\mathsf{edna}) \}, \\ \Pi^{\mathrm{G}} := \{ \mathsf{bird}(x) \Leftarrow \mathsf{emu}(x), \neg \mathsf{flies}(x) \Leftarrow \mathsf{emu}(x) \}, \\ \Delta := \{ \mathsf{flies}(x) \leftarrow \mathsf{bird}(x) \}. \\ \mathcal{A}_2 := \{ \mathsf{flies}(\mathsf{edna}) \leftarrow \mathsf{bird}(\mathsf{edna}) \}. \\ (\emptyset, \neg \mathsf{flies}(\mathsf{edna})) <_{\mathrm{P1},\mathrm{P2},\mathrm{P3},\mathrm{CP1},\mathrm{CP2}} (\mathcal{A}_2, \mathsf{flies}(\mathsf{edna})). \end{cases}$$

### Ex.2 of [Poole,1985]. Pref. of "More Concise"




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## Example 3 of [Poole, 1985] (renamed)



$$\begin{split} \Pi^{\mathrm{F}} &:= \{\mathsf{emu}(\mathsf{edna})\}, \quad \Pi^{\mathrm{G}} := \emptyset \\ \Delta &:= \{\mathsf{flies}(x) \leftarrow \mathsf{bird}(x), \ \neg \mathsf{flies}(x) \leftarrow \mathsf{emu}(x), \ \mathsf{bird}(x) \leftarrow \mathsf{emu}(x)\}. \\ \mathcal{A}_1 &:= \{\neg \mathsf{flies}(\mathsf{edna}) \leftarrow \mathsf{emu}(\mathsf{edna})\}. \\ \mathcal{A}_2 &:= \{\mathsf{flies}(\mathsf{edna}) \leftarrow \mathsf{bird}(\mathsf{edna}), \ \mathsf{bird}(\mathsf{edna}) \leftarrow \mathsf{emu}(\mathsf{edna})\}. \\ (\mathcal{A}_1, \neg \mathsf{flies}(\mathsf{edna})) \approx_{\mathrm{CP1},\mathrm{CP2}} (\mathcal{A}_2, \mathsf{flies}(\mathsf{edna})). \\ (\mathcal{A}_1, \neg \mathsf{flies}(\mathsf{edna})) <_{\mathrm{P1},\mathrm{P2},\mathrm{P3}} (\mathcal{A}_2, \mathsf{flies}(\mathsf{edna})). \end{split}$$

## **Defeasible Parts of Derivation w.r.t.** $(\Pi^{\rm F}, \Pi^{\rm G}, \Delta)$



## **Computing Specificity Relations**

(phase 1) Derive the literals that provide the basis for specificity considerations. CP1/2:  $\mathfrak{T}_{\Pi^{F}\cup\Pi^{G}}$ . P1–3:  $\mathfrak{T}_{\Pi^{F}\cup\Pi^{G}\cup\Delta}$ .

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(phase 2) On the basis of

- $\blacksquare$  a subset *H* of the literals derived in phase 1,
- the first item  $\mathcal{A}$  of a given argument  $(\mathcal{A}, L)$ , and
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we derive a further set of literals  $\mathfrak{E}: H \cup \mathcal{A} \cup \Pi^{G} \vdash \mathfrak{E}$ .

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(phase 3) On the basis of  $\mathfrak{E}$ , the literal of the argument is derived:  $\mathfrak{E} \cup \Pi^{\mathrm{F}} \cup \Pi^{\mathrm{G}} \vdash \{L\}.$ 

P1–3: phase 3 is empty:  $\mathfrak{L} = \{L\}$ .

CP1/2: It is admitted to use the facts from  $\Pi^F$  in phase 3, in addition to the general rules from  $\Pi^G$ .

## Definition [Minimal] [Simplified] Activation Set

Let  $\mathcal{A}$  be a set of ground instances of rules from  $\Delta$ , and let L be a literal.

*H* is a simplified activation set for  $(\mathcal{A}, L)$  if  $L \in \mathfrak{T}_{H \cup \mathcal{A} \cup \Pi^{G}}$ .

*H* is an *activation set* for  $(\mathcal{A}, L)$  if, for some  $\mathfrak{L} \subseteq \mathfrak{T}_{H \cup \mathcal{A} \cup \Pi^{G}}$ ,  $L \in \mathfrak{T}_{\mathfrak{E} \cup \Pi^{F} \cup \Pi^{G}}$ .

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*H* is a *minimal* [*simplified*] *activation set for* (A, L) if *H* is an [simplified] activation set for (A, L), but no proper subset of *H* is an [simplified] activation set

for  $(\mathcal{A}, L)$ .

# **Definitions of** $\leq_{CP1}$ and $\leq_{P3}$

 $(A_1, L_1) \lesssim_{CP1} (A_2, L_2)$  if  $(A_1, L_1)$  and  $(A_2, L_2)$  are arguments, and we have

- 1.  $L_1 \in \mathfrak{T}_{\Pi^{\mathrm{F}} \cup \Pi^{\mathrm{G}}}$  or
- 2.  $L_2 \notin \mathfrak{T}_{\Pi^F \cup \Pi^G}$  and every  $H \subseteq \mathfrak{T}_{\Pi^F \cup \Pi^G}$  that is an [minimal] activation set for  $(\mathcal{A}_1, L_1)$ is also an activation set for  $(\mathcal{A}_2, L_2)$ .


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 $(\mathcal{A}_1, L_1) \lesssim_{\mathrm{P3}} (\mathcal{A}_2, L_2)$  if  $(\mathcal{A}_1, L_1)$  and  $(\mathcal{A}_2, L_2)$  are arguments,  $L_2 \in \mathfrak{T}_{\Pi^F \cup \Pi^G}$  implies  $L_1 \in \mathfrak{T}_{\Pi^F \cup \Pi^G}$ , and, for every  $H \subseteq \mathfrak{T}_{\Pi^F \cup \Pi^G \cup \Delta}$ that is a [minimal] simplified activation set for  $(\mathcal{A}_1, L_1)$ but not a simplified activation set for  $(\emptyset, L_1)$ , H is also a simplified activation set for  $(\mathcal{A}_2, L_2)$ .

#### Example Not Transitive. Pref. of "More Precise"




## Conclusion: Novel Specificity Relations are ...

#### Transitive!

- Monotonic w.r.t. Conjunction!
- Even More Intuitive!
- Slightly More Efficient!
- More Comparing?


Theorem:  $\leq_{P3} \subseteq \leq_{CP1}$ . Corollary:  $\Delta_{CP1} \subseteq \Delta_{P3}$ . But in general:  $<_{P3} \not\subseteq <_{CP1}$ . Luckily! (Otherwise monotonicity w.r.t.  $\land$  would be lost.)

#### [Poole,1985,Example 6]: Monotonicity w.r.t. $\land$




 $(\mathcal{A}_{1},\neg \mathsf{c}) <_{\mathrm{P1}-3}(\mathcal{A}_{2},\mathsf{c}), (\mathcal{A}_{1},\neg \mathsf{f}) <_{\mathrm{P1}-3}(\mathcal{A}_{2},\mathsf{f}), \mathsf{but}(\mathcal{A}_{1},\mathsf{g}_{1}) \triangle_{\mathrm{P1}-3}(\mathcal{A}_{2},\mathsf{g}_{2}).$  $(\mathcal{A}_{1},\neg \mathsf{c}) \approx_{\mathrm{CP1}/2} (\mathcal{A}_{2},\mathsf{c}), (\mathcal{A}_{1},\neg \mathsf{f}) \approx_{\mathrm{CP1}/2} (\mathcal{A}_{2},\mathsf{f}), \mathsf{so}(\mathcal{A}_{1},\mathsf{g}_{1}) \approx_{\mathrm{CP1}/2} (\mathcal{A}_{2},\mathsf{g}_{2}).$ 

#### 1<sup>st</sup> Variation of [Poole,1985,Example 6]




 $(\mathcal{A}_{1},\neg \mathsf{c}) <_{\mathrm{P1-3}}(\mathcal{A}_{2},\mathsf{c}), (\mathcal{A}_{1},\neg \mathsf{f}) <_{\mathrm{P1-3}}(\mathcal{A}_{2},\mathsf{f}), \mathsf{but}(\mathcal{A}_{1},\mathsf{g}_{1}) \triangle_{\mathrm{P1-3}}(\mathcal{A}_{2},\mathsf{g}_{2}).$  $(\mathcal{A}_{1},\neg \mathsf{c}) <_{\mathrm{CP1/2}}(\mathcal{A}_{2},\mathsf{c}), (\mathcal{A}_{1},\neg \mathsf{f}) \approx_{\mathrm{CP1/2}}(\mathcal{A}_{2},\mathsf{f}), \mathsf{SO}(\mathcal{A}_{1},\mathsf{g}_{1}) <_{\mathrm{CP1/2}}(\mathcal{A}_{2},\mathsf{g}_{2}).$ 



 $(\mathcal{A}_1, \neg \mathsf{lovely}) <_{\mathrm{P1-3}} (\mathcal{A}_2, \mathsf{lovely}).$  $(\mathcal{A}_1, \neg \mathsf{lovely}) <_{\mathrm{CP1/2}} (\mathcal{A}_2, \mathsf{lovely}).$ 


#### "More Precise", 2<sup>nd</sup> Var. of [Poole, 1985, Ex. 6]



 $(\mathcal{A}_1, \neg \mathsf{c}) <_{\mathrm{P1-3}} (\mathcal{A}_2, \mathsf{c}), \mathsf{but} (\mathcal{A}_1, \mathsf{g}_1) \triangle_{\mathrm{P1-3}} (\mathcal{A}_2, \mathsf{g}_2).$ 


 $(\mathcal{A}_1,\neg c)\approx_{\mathrm{CP1/2}}(\mathcal{A}_2,c),$  but  $(\mathcal{A}_1,g_1)>_{\mathrm{CP1/2}}(\mathcal{A}_2,g_2),$  "more precise".

#### "Precise vs. Concise", 3rd Var. [Poole, 1985, Ex. 6]




The conflict between a being "more concise" than b and  $b \wedge d$  being "more precise" than a is indeed irresolvable.

## [Stolzenbg, 2003, Ex.11]: No Pruning for $\leq_{P3}$ !




 $(\mathcal{A}^1 \cup \mathcal{A}^4 \cup \mathcal{A}^5, \mathbf{x}) <_{CP1/2} (\mathcal{A}^2 \cup \mathcal{A}^4 \cup \mathcal{A}^5, \neg \mathbf{x}) \approx_{CP1/2} (\mathcal{A}^3 \cup \mathcal{A}^4, \mathbf{x}).$  All  $\lesssim_{P1-3}$ -incomparable! For  $(\mathcal{A}^1 \cup \mathcal{A}^4 \cup \mathcal{A}^5, \mathbf{x}) \not\leq_{P3} (\mathcal{A}^2 \cup \mathcal{A}^4 \cup \mathcal{A}^5, \neg \mathbf{x})$  we have to consider (implicitly via  $\{d, f\} \subseteq \mathfrak{T}_{\Pi^F \cup \Pi^G \cup \Delta}$ ) the defeasible rule of  $\mathcal{A}^3$ , which is not part of any of the two arguments under comparison. No pruning possible for  $\leq_{P1-3}$ -interval.

## Variation of [Stolzenbg, 2003, Ex.11]




 $\begin{aligned} (\mathcal{A}^4, \mathsf{x}) \approx_{\mathrm{CP1/2}} (\mathcal{A}^1 \cup \mathcal{A}^4 \cup \mathcal{A}^5, \mathsf{x}) >_{\mathrm{CP1/2}} (\mathcal{A}^2 \cup \mathcal{A}^4 \cup \mathcal{A}^5, \neg \mathsf{x}). \\ \text{Makes sense because } d \wedge e \text{ is more precise (specific) than d.} \\ c \wedge d \wedge e \text{ is irrelevant because approach is model-theoretic.} \\ (\mathcal{A}^4, \mathsf{x}) <_{\mathrm{P1-3}} (\mathcal{A}^1 \cup \mathcal{A}^4 \cup \mathcal{A}^5, \mathsf{x}) \ \Delta_{\mathrm{P1-3}} (\mathcal{A}^2 \cup \mathcal{A}^4 \cup \mathcal{A}^5, \neg \mathsf{x}) \ \Delta_{\mathrm{P1-3}} \\ (\text{Bullshit!}) \\ \end{aligned}$ 

### [Stolzenburg, 2003, Ex. p.95]: Global Effect!



 $(\mathcal{A}_1, \neg \mathsf{p}(\mathsf{a})) \approx_{\mathrm{P1}-3, \mathrm{CP1}/2} (\mathcal{A}_2, \mathsf{p}(\mathsf{a})).$ 


 $\leq_{\rm CP1}$  vs.  $\leq_{\rm CP2}$ 



$$\begin{split} \Pi^{\mathrm{F}} &:= \{ \mathsf{thirst}, \mathsf{danger} \}, \\ \Pi^{\mathrm{G}} &:= \emptyset, \quad \Delta := \mathcal{A}_1 \cup \mathcal{A}_3, \\ \mathcal{A}_1 &:= \{ \mathsf{drink} \leftarrow \mathsf{thirst} \}, \\ \mathcal{A}_2 &:= \{ \mathsf{alarm} \leftarrow \mathsf{danger} \}. \\ \mathcal{A}_3 &:= \mathcal{A}_2 \cup \{ \mathsf{danger} \leftarrow \mathsf{thirst} \}. \end{split}$$

 $\begin{aligned} & (\mathcal{A}_{2}, \mathsf{alarm}) <_{\mathrm{CP1}} (\mathcal{A}_{3}, \mathsf{alarm}) \approx_{\mathrm{CP2}} (\mathcal{A}_{2}, \mathsf{alarm}) \\ & (\mathcal{A}_{1}, \mathsf{drink}) <_{\mathrm{CP1}} (\mathcal{A}_{3}, \mathsf{alarm}) \vartriangle_{\mathrm{CP2}} (\mathcal{A}_{1}, \mathsf{drink}) \\ & (\mathcal{A}_{1}, \mathsf{drink}) \bigtriangleup_{\mathrm{CP1}} (\mathcal{A}_{2}, \mathsf{alarm}) \bigtriangleup_{\mathrm{CP2}} (\mathcal{A}_{1}, \mathsf{drink}) \end{aligned}$ 

#### Example Not Transitive. Pref. of "More Precise"



 $\mathcal{A}_1 := \{ \mathsf{e} \leftarrow \mathsf{alcohol} \land \mathsf{blessing} \land \mathsf{thirst}, \mathsf{beer} \leftarrow \mathsf{e} \},\$  $\mathcal{A}_2 := \{ wine \leftarrow alcohol \land blessing \}, \}$  $\mathcal{A}_3 := \{ \mathsf{vodka} \leftarrow \mathsf{alcohol} \}, \quad \Delta := \mathcal{A}_1 \cup \mathcal{A}_2 \cup \mathcal{A}_3,$  $\Pi^{\mathrm{F}} := \{ \mathsf{alcohol}, \mathsf{blessing}, \mathsf{thirst} \}, \quad \Pi^{\mathrm{G}} := \{ \mathsf{wine} \leftarrow \mathsf{e} \},$  $(A_1, beer) <_{P1-3,CP1/2} (A_2, wine) <_{P1-3,CP1/2} (A_3, vodka), but$  $(\mathcal{A}_1, \mathsf{beer}) <_{\mathrm{CP1/2}} (\mathcal{A}_3, \mathsf{vodka}) \not\geq_{\mathrm{P1-3}} (\mathcal{A}_1, \mathsf{beer}).$ 

A *quasi-ordering* is a reflexive transitive relation. An *(irreflexive) ordering* is an irreflexive transitive relation. A *reflexive ordering* (also called: "partial ordering") is an anti-symmetric quasi-ordering.

An equivalence is a symmetric quasi-ordering.

We will use several binary relations  $\leq_N$  comparing arguments according to their specificity.

**Corollary 0** If  $\leq_N$  is a quasi-ordering, then its equivalence  $\approx_N$  is an equivalence, its ordering  $<_N$  is an ordering, and its reflexive ordering  $\leq_N$  is a reflexive ordering.

## **Abstract Specificity Orderings**

For any relation written as  $\leq_N$ ("being more or equivalently specific w.r.t. *N*"), we define:

 $\gtrsim_N := \{ (X,Y) \mid Y \leq_N X \}$  ("less or equivalently specific"),  $\approx_N := \leq_N \cap \geq_N$ ("equivalently specific"),  $<_N$  :=  $\leq_N \setminus \geq_N$ ("properly more specific"),  $\leq_N := \langle X \cup \{ (X, X) \mid X \text{ is an argument } \}$ ("more specific or equal"),  $\Delta_N := \left\{ \begin{array}{c} (X,Y) \\ X \not\leq_N Y \text{ are arguments with} \\ X \not\leq_N Y \text{ and } X \not\geq_N Y \end{array} \right\}$ 

("incomparable w.r.t. specificity").


## **Efficiency Considerations**

- Let *H* be a set of hypotheses. Then, roughly speaking,  $(A_1, L_1) \leq (A_2, L_2)$  if every activation set *H* for  $(A_1, L_1)$  is also one for  $(A_2, L_2)$ .
- Naïve procedure enumerates possible activation sets, which is exponential in the number of possible hypothesis literals.
- Clearly, the effort for computing  $\leq_{CP1}$  is lower than that of  $\leq_{P3}$  because of  $\mathfrak{T}_{\Pi} \subseteq \mathfrak{T}_{\Pi \cup \Delta}$ .
- While checking S<sub>Px</sub>, attention cannot be restricted to derivations which make use only of defeasible rules given in the arguments. Therefore, [Stolzenburg&al, 2003] introduce pruning derivation trees.

## Path Characterization for Specificity

- $(\mathcal{A}_1, L_1) \leq (\mathcal{A}_2, L_2)$  if  $(\mathcal{A}_1, L_1)$  and  $(\mathcal{A}_2, L_2)$  are two arguments in the given specification and for each derivation tree  $T_1$  for  $L_1$  there is a derivation tree  $T_2$  for  $L_2$  such that  $T_1 \leq T_2$ .
- Let  $T_1$  and  $T_2$  be derivation trees. Then,  $T_1 \leq T_2$  if for each  $t_2 \in \text{Paths}(T_2)$  there is a path  $t_1 \in \text{Paths}(T_1)$  such that  $t_1 \subseteq t_2$  (omitting the root nodes).
- If the arguments involved in the comparison correspond to exactly one and-tree, then ≤<sub>P2</sub> coincides with the path characterization (≤ and ≤). Cf. Example 1 of [Poole, 1985].
- Two and-trees can be compared efficiently w.r.t. <a>!</a>. It requires pairwise comparison of all nodes in the trees for each path. Hence, the respective complexity is polynomial in the size of the derivation trees.

### Path vs. Argument Characterization



- Poole's specificity:  $(A_1, \neg \text{lovely}) <_{P1-3} (A_2, \text{lovely})$
- Corrected version:  $(A_1, \neg \text{lovely}) <_{CP1/2} (A_2, \text{lovely})$
- Path characterization: (A<sub>1</sub>,¬lovely) ≤ (A<sub>2</sub>,lovely)
   {{noisy, grandpa}, {someb., grandpa}} {{someb., grandpa}}
   {{someb., grandpa}} {{someb., grandpa}}
   Argument sets: (A<sub>1</sub>,¬lovely) ⊑ (A<sub>2</sub>,lovely)
   {{noisy, somebody}, {grandpa}} {{somebody}, {grandpa}}

## **Back to the Arguments**

- Characterization dual to ≤ based on the rules in the arguments:
- Let  $(A_1, L_1)$  and  $(A_2, L_2)$  be two arguments and  $R_i$  (i = 1, 2)be the set of (strict and defeasible) rule bodies used in the respective proofs. We define:  $R_1 \sqsubseteq R_2$  if for all  $r_1 \in R_1$  there exists an  $r_2 \in R_2$  such that  $r_2 \subseteq r_1$ .
- Simplified version: Interpret 
  simply as subset (w.r.t. complete rule sets).
- This is close to the notion *more conservative than* [Besnard&Hunter, 2001]:  $A_1 \subseteq A_2$  and  $L_2 \vdash L_1$ .
- Checking ⊆ on ground literal sets can be done efficiently (NP-complete for general literals).

### **Further Conclusions**

- Computing S<sub>CPx</sub> can be done by a modified SLD-resolution procedure, but has to enumerate all possible derivations for each query.
- Path (⊴) and argument (□) characterizations can be computed efficiently. However, they coincide with specificity notion only in special cases (e.g. no strict rules).
- Further investigation is required ...
- Thank you very much for your attention!